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The long-awaited Chilcot report has given the most sound and damning judgment by far for the British campaign in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s role in it. It concluded the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not necessary and failed to meet its stated objectives.
The Chilcot inquiry, commissioned by then Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2009, has taken 7 years to bring about this assessment. Over the course, 10 million pounds were spent, some 150 witnesses summoned and around 130 hearings held. Despite it was widely believed before its publication that it would be a harsh critique of the decision and decision-makers of the war, the 2.6 million word report, in its final form, made many revelations more damaging and disturbing than expected concerning the war’s decision-making process, execution and the nature of UK-US coordination before the war.
On the nature of the Iraq war, the report clearly concluded that the Iraq war is a war of choice as peaceful options for disarmament had not been exhausted. In the absence of a majority in support of military action, the UK was undermining the Security Council’s authority. On the decision process that leads to the war, the report painted a picture of rather small-circle decision-making style. The decision to take part in the war was made without collective ministerial consideration of its implications. Even though it did not say Mr. Blair and his colleagues had lied about the intelligence claiming Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, it concluded that the policy was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and they were not challenged, as they should have been.
On the US-UK coordination before and during the war, the report’s account is most telling and speaks of the nature of the so-called special relationship. In short, the UK overestimated its influence over the US in planning, conducting the war and the ensuing post-war occupation of Iraq. Mr. Blair originally sought a partnership with the US as a way of influencing President Bush but failed completely. In late 2001 and early 2002, he suggested to President Bush a somewhat “clever strategy” for regime change in Iraq but was dragged to Iraq war anyway. In March 2003, he failed to persuade the US of the advantages of an UN-led administration and in Coalition Provisional Authority that was established after the invasion, the UK struggled to have a decisive effect on its policies.
Despite the fact that the report is a scathing verdict of Iraq war, it is by no means justice eventually served. The report has made it clear it is not a legal proceeding, and neither Mr. Blair nor anyone else could stand trial because of the report’s findings. Even though Mr. Blair claimed taking full responsibility for any mistakes following the report’s publication, he defended his decision to go to war and appeared unrepentant. More importantly, damages were already done. Lives were lost, families displaced, nation broken and the whole region destabilized, but politicians who made such consequential decisions walk free from them. History is the judgment and the report is nothing more than a new testimony attesting to politicians’ folly and the war’s guilt.
ZHANGBei
Assistant Research Fellow, Department for European Studies, China Institute of International Studies)
